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Abstract 
 
 This study provides new evidence on the role of institutional investors in corporate 
strategy, specifically in mergers and acquisitions and for three subsets of deals. For firms that are 
harder to value with greater information asymmetry, institutional investor cross-ownership 
between two firms increases transaction fees, reduces deal premiums, and lowers cash 
consideration in deals. Firms with greater analyst following and cross ownership as a percentage 
of total institutional ownership pay less fees, lower deal premiums, and less cash consideration in 
deals. Higher analyst following also contributes to lower completion probabilities while higher 
cross ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership increases completion probability. 
While my results suggest that synergies are largely unaffected by cross ownership and the 
subsets listed above, my overall results suggest that institutional cross-ownership will continue to 
affect strategic decision-making processes moving forward.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study aims to improve our understanding of how cross-level institutional ownership 
affects outcomes in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) process. Institutional investor cross-
ownership occurs when an investor who owns shares of one firm in an M&A process also owns 
shares of the other firm in the same M&A process. In the financial services industry, in both the 
sell-side and buy-side realms, understanding the various drivers of M&A as well as how they 
result in certain outcomes is incredibly important. In the specific case of institutional investor 
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cross ownership, there is a great deal of research on how varying levels of this variable broadly 
affects outcomes in M&A.   
Cross-level institutional ownership can play a major role in M&A outcomes. Brooks et 
al. (2008) has found that higher levels of cross-level institutional ownership not only increase the 
probability of two firms merging, but also affects outcomes of the transaction as well (e.g. 
reduced deal premiums, increased stock payment in transactions, and lowered completion 
probabilities of deals with negative acquirer announcement returns). They also found that deals 
with high institutional investor cross-ownership tend to have lower transaction costs and that the 
combined firm discloses more transparent financial statement information post-acquisition, with 
the ultimate effect of institutional investor cross-ownership on the total deal synergies and post-
deal long-term performance being positive. 
This paper extends the Brooks et al. (2018) analysis to investigate several open 
questions. First, while Brooks et al. (2018) examine cross-level institutional ownership using an 
OLS specification with time and industry fixed effects, I believe it would be interesting to see 
which industries and during which periods in time (i.e., merger waves, recessionary periods) 
does institutional cross-ownership matter more in M&A outcomes. An examination of the 
individual coefficients of industry and time effects did not reveal any insights.  
Second, I will look into whether there is cross-sectional variation in the relationship 
between cross-level institutional ownership and the M&A outcome variables (as Brooks, Chen, 
and Zheng do not look at interaction variables or perform other cross-sectional analyses). For 
example, I plan to investigate whether the relationship between cross-level institutional 
ownership and the outcome variables is stronger (or weaker) among the following cross-sectional 
characteristics: 
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• Firms that have higher potential information asymmetry or are harder to value (such as 
high R&D, greater intangible assets, higher bid-ask spreads) 
• Firms that have more or less analyst following 
• The overall percentage of institutional ownership at the buyer and target that represents 
cross-ownership. 
  
Understanding the role of institutions in post-merger outcomes is important for three 
main groups. The first group includes sell-side firms like investment banks, as they would have a 
better idea on where to source potential deals. With institutional shareholder information already 
publicly available, banks could use the results in this study to refine their search for potential 
new advising opportunities along various factors like industry, levels of institutional investor 
cross ownership, as well as other factors. In addition, after securing the advising opportunity, 
banks could structure transactions better based on the analysis with a better understanding of 
stock-based transactions, deal premiums, etc.   
Another group that I believe will benefit from this research includes buy-side firms like 
hedge funds looking for new potential investment opportunities. With the same access to 
publicly available shareholder information as banks, asset managers and hedge funds would be 
able to better predict where successful potential M&A transactions are more likely to occur or 
better predict which publicly announced transactions may perform better than others.   
The third group that will benefit is academics, because this paper will expand upon the 
current literature around M&A outcomes and institutional investor cross ownership. This paper 
will hopefully also help provoke thought around the importance of cross-sectional areas of 
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investigation concerning the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and M&A 
outcomes for a most recent subsets of firms. 
 
2. Existing Literature 
 
Several prior studies have examined the factors that helps facilitate successful M&A 
transactions. One variable in particular that has been studied is the level of institutional 
ownership of both target and acquirer firm (known as cross-ownership) and how it affects the 
outcomes of these deals. The level of common institutional investor ownership has been studied 
in the context of M&A, but also in contexts indirectly related, providing further avenues for 
research and exploration. 
With regards to research around institutional investors, a large set of the recent literature 
focuses on institutional investors in the context of shareholder activism, and more specifically 
how these large institutional investors can effect changes in companies. Some of these changes 
in companies include forcing management to partake in certain merger and acquisition 
transactions. Becht, Polo, and Rossi (2016) look at how hedge fund activism — particularly by 
institutional investors — is a huge channel of influence for those investors.  Specifically, they 
argue that institutional investors’ ability to affect shareholder voting can specifically lower 
agency conflict and deter CEOs from making overconfident decisions, thereby resulting in more 
successful M&A transactions as value-destructive transactions do not make it past a shareholder 
vote. However, Becht et al. (2018) examined M&A transactions in the UK where rules require 
shareholder voting for transactions of a certain size (as opposed to the US where such voting is 
not mandatory).   
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Becht et al’s (2018) research is extended by Li, Liu and Wu (2018) which looks at all-
stock US deals where shareholder voting is required for deals in which the acquiring firm issues 
more than 20% of new shares to finance the transaction. Their findings are similar in that the 
shareholder vote serves as a sort of disciplinary device that forces acquirer management to 
choose target firms with potentially greater synergies and/or lower offer premiums than in cases 
without shareholder voting, thereby further highlighting the importance of institutional investors 
monitoring M&A transactions. While these two pieces of literature discuss institutional investor 
ownership from a sole owner basis (not in the context of cross-ownership), the findings as well 
as the methods of sampling and testing data prove useful towards understanding the topic as well 
as providing a basis for further research. 
Building upon existing literature on institutional investor ownership, many studies have 
looked at how institutional level cross-ownership affects companies, deals and other attributes as 
well. Scholars have looked at institutional level cross-ownership in various different contexts 
outside of M&A, but with potential extensions and connections to M&A. These contexts include 
corporate innovation, competition between firms (generally speaking as well as in the airline 
industry more specifically), product market competition, market mechanisms, corporate 
governance, and disclosure practices. In the context of corporate innovation, Gao, Shen, Gao, 
and Chan (2019) looked at a sample of Chinese firms from 2003 through 2016 and measured 
whether institutional investor cross-ownership had an impact on a firm’s ability to innovate. In 
the context of my proposed study, there seems to be potential to review the analysis on a newer 
data set and on US firms and whether or not the higher levels of corporate innovation lead to an 
increased or decreased desire for potential M&A (derived from a firm’s ability or lack thereof to 
innovate organically to grow).   
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In terms of competition amongst firms, both Connely, Lee, Tihanyi, Certo, and Johnson 
(2019) as well as Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2018) looked at how institutional investor cross-
ownership impacted competition. Both studies came to similar conclusions in that rival firms 
with similar ownership structures will engage in dissimilar competitive actions to avoid directly 
competing with one another. While Azar et al.’s (2018) analysis is limited to just the airline 
industry (using a sample of US publicly traded airlines up to 2016Q2), there is potential to 
explore the analysis in other industries and on newer data sets.   
He and Huang (2017) found in their research that cross-held firms experienced 
significantly higher market share growth than non-cross-held firms and that institutional investor 
cross-ownership “facilitates explicit forms of product market collaboration (such as within-
industry joint ventures, strategic alliances, or within-industry acquisitions) and improves 
innovation productivity and operating profitability.” Building upon that research, He, Huang and 
Zhao (2019) looked at how this cross-level ownership incentivizes institutional investors to be 
more active in their monitoring, illustrating the point that institutional cross-ownership serves “as 
a market-based mechanism to alleviate the inefficiency induced by governance 
externalities.” From a disclosure perspective, Jung (2013) investigates how an overlap in 
institutional investor ownership between two firms acts “as a mechanism by which a first-mover 
firm’s increase in disclosure prompts investors to seek a similar increase from a follower firm” 
and that ultimately, investor overlap works as a channel of communication and feedback 
mechanism. 
Some scholars have looked at this cross-level ownership directly in the context of 
M&A. Brooks, Chen, and Zeng (2018) looked directly at how the role of institutional investors 
affects corporate strategy and more specifically how institutional level cross-ownership affects 
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outcomes in mergers and acquisitions. While their findings show that higher cross-level 
ownership leads to an increased probability of merging, reduced deal premiums, and increased 
stock payments among other results), their data set only resembles data from a 30-year window 
from 1984-2014. With the M&A market heating up over the last five years, there is potential to 
reinvestigate these findings on a new set of data as well as classify different time periods for 
analysis as well. In addition, this research is generally contradicted by Harford, Jenter and Li 
(2017) who argue that institutional investor cross-holdings are too small to matter in most M&A 
transactions. With a similarly less recent sample, there is opportunity to reinvestigate findings in 
this case as well, especially with the number of M&A deals worldwide increasing at a CAGR of 
5.1% since 2014 up to 2018 (IMAA). In addition, there is an opportunity to reinvestigate Brooks 
et al.’s (2018) findings in a cross-sectional context as discussed in the introduction. 
Ultimately, there are some gaps in the current research, especially with the outdated 
nature of some of the sample transactions used in the papers. In addition to potentially 
performing similar analyses as some above-discussed prior studies with newer data, our research 
could be classified by different industries or comparisons could be made between different time 
periods of M&A activity as well. In addition, with the research done on institutional level cross-
ownership in fields not exactly M&A, there are many potential links between those fields and the 
success or failure of M&A transactions as well as other driving factors related to M&A deals.   
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
This study uses archival data to investigate the research questions. First, in order to 
collect the sample of mergers and acquisitions, I use the Thomson Reuters securities Data 
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Company Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC Platinum). To further refine the 
sample, I start with all US domestic mergers and acquisitions announced between 1977 - 2018 
(ten more years than the sample used by Brooks, Chen, and Zeng, 2018). Following the 
guidelines of Brooks et al., I require that both acquirers and targets be US publicly traded 
companies so that institutional cross-ownership can be calculated, excluding transactions labeled 
as minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, privatizations, repurchases, 
exchange offers, self-tenders, recapitalizations or spin-offs. In addition, the percentage of the 
target’s shares that are owned by the acquirer prior to and after the transaction must be less than 
50% and at least 90%, respectively. I exclude deals that are less than $1 million in transactions 
value. I also use the Compustat database for accounting data and the CRSP database for stock 
price data. Finally, the sample is limited to deals in which the acquirer and target have data from 
those two databases and all independent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. To 
calculate institutional cross ownership, I link the M&A sample with the Thomson Financial 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. Table A2 presents a distribution of the sample of 
deals by year and by industry and suggests that the sample is representative of the general deal 
environment of its time period and is well diversified.   
In terms of analyzing the data, I will also be taking a similar approach as Brooks, Chen 
and Zeng (2018) did with their multivariate analysis. The main empirical approach will be two 
ordinary least squares regressions. The first regression will investigate whether there is cross-
sectional variation in the relationship between cross-level institutional ownership and the M&A 
outcome variables (as discussed above, Brooks, Chen, and Zheng do not look at interaction 
variables or perform other cross-sectional analyses). Specifically, the regression will look into 
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how the effects on the outcome variables change as acquirer cross ownership and target cross 
ownership change. 
This first regression will be as follows with the variables discussed above, as in Brooks et 
al., controls for both year and industry fixed effects: 
 
Y = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1* ACO + 𝛽2 * TCO + 𝛽3 * (ACO * TCO) + Controls + Fixed Effects + 𝜀 
 
The second regression will also investigate whether there is cross-sectional variation in 
the relationship between cross-level institutional ownership and the M&A outcome variables. 
For example, is the relationship between cross-level institutional ownership and the outcome 
variables stronger (or weaker) among: 1) Firms that have higher potential information 
asymmetry or are harder to value (such as high R&D, greater intangible assets, higher bid-ask 
spreads) 2) Firms that have more/less analyst following 3) Firms that with higher/lower cross-
ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership? 
This second regression will be as follows with the variables discussed above, as in 
Brooks et al., controls for both year and industry fixed effects: 
 
Y = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1* ACO + 𝛽2 * TCO + 𝛽3 * (ACO * Var) + 𝛽4 * (TCO * Var) + Controls + 
Fixed Effects + 𝜀 
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3. Results 
 
 The main outcome variables that I examined are Total Transaction Fees paid (FTOT), 
Deal Premium (DealPrem), Cash Consideration used in deal (PCT_Cash), Synergies achieved 
(Synergies), and Completion Probability (Completed).  I initially run regressions to determine 
the effects of acquirer cross ownership and target cross ownership on those outcome variables, 
following the controls laid out by Brooks et al. After those regressions, I proceeded with my 
cross-sectional analysis to see how those effects varied for firms with more or less information 
asymmetry, analyst following, and cross ownership as a percentage of total institutional 
ownership. In looking at the first cross section of analysis with regards to information 
asymmetry, I looked at three main indicators: Research and Development (R&D) expense scaled 
by total revenue, Intangible Assets scaled by total assets, Bid Ask spread 1 month before the deal 
announcement. For the second cross sectional analysis, I looked at unique analysts following 
from both the acquirer and target level.  For the final cross section analysis, I looked at the ratio 
of cross ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership.  
 
3a. Total Transaction Fees 
  
In looking at the effects of institutional investor cross ownership on the transaction fees 
of a M&A deal, similar to Brooks et al., I am essentially looking to see if institutional cross-
owners have a governance role in reducing information asymmetry and facilitating bargaining 
between target and acquirer better than a deal between two entirely independent parties. In 
addition, similar to Brooks et al., I hypothesize that if firms connected by institutional cross-
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owners have greater information and better knowledge about the long-term profitability of a deal, 
there may be a lower need to hire investment banks to provide professional advice and therefore 
result in lower M&A advisory fees for such deals (2018). 
 Panel A of Table 1 presents the results examining transactions fees. While Brooks et al. 
showed for an average deal that one more institutional top 10 cross-owner (unique number of 
owners) is associated with a $0.9 million reduction in acquirer financial advisor fees and a $1.0 
million reduction in target financial advisor fees, I find largely opposite results. With the larger, 
more recent sample, I found that acquirer cross ownership and target cross ownership actually 
increased total transaction fees with each percentage increasing total fees for both all deals in the 
sample as well as for completed deals in the sample. A 10% increase in acquirer and target cross 
ownership results in about a $.7 million and $.3 million increase in transaction fees. This result 
differs from my initial hypothesis but may be due to the more recent sample size and difference 
in looking at all institutional owners from a collective level rather than on an incremental per 
investor level. In looking at the interactions between acquirer cross ownership and target cross 
ownership, while both cross ownerships resulted in lower transaction fees, the interaction signals 
that the increasing presence of the other cross ownership variable resulted in an increase in total 
fees paid. 
 Panel B of Table 1 examines the cross-sectional effects of information asymmetry.  In 
Column 1, I found that while both higher levels of R&D from acquiring firms and target firms 
led to marginally higher transaction fees and that both acquirer and target cross ownership also 
increased total fees, consistent with my earlier results. In the presence of the interaction term in 
Column 2, the increased presence of R&D for acquiring firms led to lower total fees: a 10% 
increase in information asymmetry ultimately led to a $.6 million decrease in total fees paid. In 
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Column 3, I find that high levels of intangible assets (scaled by total assets) also led to an 
increase in total fees paid with a 10% increase in intangibles resulting in a $.4 million and $.2 
million increase in total fees for acquiring and target firms respectively.  In the presence of the 
interaction in Column 4, those effects were strengthened as increased intangibles for both 
acquiring and target firms increased total fees paid greatly with a 10% increase in intangibles 
resulting in a $.9 million increase in fees for both acquiring and target firms.  Looking into 
Column 5, I find that target firms with higher 1-month bid ask spreads paid substantially higher 
transaction fees with a 10% increase resulting in an increase of $2.9 million in fees. In the 
presence of the interaction in Column 6, I find that that effect was mitigated for both acquiring 
firms and target firms who had high 1-month bid ask spreads. Overall, these results indicate that 
firms that are harder to value generally pay more in transaction fees, but with higher market 
misalignment on value leading up to the deal, may pay lower fees.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel C of Table 1examines the cross-sectional influence of analyst 
following. I find higher analyst following from the acquiring firm resulted in lower total 
transaction fees with each additional unique analyst lowering transaction fees by $.02 million 
and higher analyst following from target firms increased transaction fees by $.04 million. In the 
presence of interaction terms in Column 2 however, I find that the effects from higher analyst 
following for acquiring firms are reversed for firms with acquiring firms with higher cross 
ownership. In addition, the increased cross ownership for target firms strengthens the effect of 
analyst following, boosting transaction fees by an additional $1.0 million. From these results, it 
is clear that analyst following plays a minor role in reducing fees paid by firms in transactions as 
the effects from acquiring firms and target firms largely cancel one another out. 
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 Finally, I examine whether target and acquiror cross-ownership differentially influence 
each other in terms of their relationship with transactions fees. In Columns 3 and 4 of Panel C of 
Table 1, I find that greater percentage of cross ownership represented of total institutional 
ownership for acquiring firms led to an increase in total fees by small increase in total fees of 
$.09 million for an increase of 10%. For target firms, an increase of cross ownership as a 
percentage of total institutional ownership by 10% resulted in a decrease of transaction fees by 
$.1 million. In the presence of the interaction terms in Column 5,  I find that while it seems that 
both cross ownership and cross ownership as a percentage of total fees significantly reduces 
transaction fees, those effects are largely reversed in the presence of the interaction term. This is 
consistent with my earlier results that cross ownership generally increases transaction fees and 
the larger cross ownership as percentage of total institutional ownership, especially for firms 
with higher cross ownership already, the larger the total transaction fees that are paid. 
 
3b. Deal Premiums 
 
Table 2 looks at the effects of institutional investor cross ownership on the deal premium 
of M&A deals, Brooks et al. found that institutional cross ownership reduces deal premiums, 
thus leading to better value for acquirers (2018). In Panel A of Table 2, I find that acquirer cross 
ownership tends to do decrease deal premiums and target cross ownership increases deal 
premiums with a 10% increase in cross ownership representing a .08% decrease and .07% 
increase in the premiums respectively. In the presence of the interaction in Column 2, I find that 
higher levels of the opposing ownership tends to increase the deal premium with a 10% increase 
in cross ownership resulting in a .05% increase in deal premium on top of the effects of the 
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individual variables. These results are consistent across regressions run with and without fixed 
effects.  
Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the effects of institutional cross ownership for firms with 
higher levels of information asymmetry on deal premiums. Columns 1 and 2 focus on R&D 
expenditures and acquiring and target firms with higher levels of R&D expense (scaled by total 
revenue) tend to result in lower deal premiums. Consistent with the earlier results, acquirer cross 
ownership significantly reduces deal premiums while target cross ownership tends to increase 
deal premiums as shown in Column 2. In looking at how deal premium was affected for firms 
with higher levels of information asymmetry, Column 3 shows that acquiring and target firms 
with higher R&D generally resulted in lower deal premiums paid as well; however, the effect on 
lowering deal premiums was reversed in the presence of the interaction. Column 4 shows that 
acquiring and target firms with higher levels of intangible assets resulted in higher deal 
premiums with a 10% increase in intangible assets scaled by total assets resulting in a .3% 
increase in deal premium. In the presence of the interaction in Column 4, with that effect was 
reversed for acquiring firms with high levels of intangible assets and increased for target firms 
with higher levels of intangible assets. Columns 5 and 6 show the effects of cross ownership and 
1-month bid ask spreads on deal premiums. Column 5 shows that higher bid ask spreads on the 
1-month level of acquiring firms generally led to lower deal premiums as well with target bid ask 
spreads leading to higher deal premiums with a 10% increase in the bid ask spread scaled by 
price reducing deal premiums by 3.4% and increasing premiums by 2.7% for acquiring and 
target firs respectively. These effects were increased for firms with acquiring and target firms 
with higher levels of cross ownership by 1.0% and 11.4% respectively. 
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Panel C of Table 2 examines the cross-sectional influence of analyst following on deal 
premiums. Column 1 is consistent with earlier results in coefficient and magnitude showing that 
increases in acquirer cross ownership reduces deal premiums and increases in target cross 
ownership tends to increase deal premiums. Column 2 indicates that while the effects of analyst 
following were not significant, they tend to be strengthened for increases in acquirer and target 
cross ownership, respectively. For acquiring firms, this effect was increased by .5% for firms 
with higher cross ownership and for target firms, this effect was decreased further by .3% for 
firms with high levels of cross ownership. 
In looking at Columns 3 and 4 of Panel C of Table 2, I find that higher levels of cross 
ownership as a percentage of total ownership for both acquiring firms and target resulted in 
lower deal premiums by .08% and .003% respectively for acquiring and target firms for a 10% 
increase in the cross ownership/total institutional ownership ratio. Column 4 shows that while 
insignificant, these results are bolstered for acquiring firms with higher cross ownership and 
mitigated for target firms with higher levels of cross ownership. 
 
3c. Cash Consideration 
 
 In looking at the form of payment in M&A transactions, Brooks et al. found that higher 
levels of institutional investor cross ownership resulted in higher levels of stock payment and 
lower levels of cash payment used in the transaction (2018). In Column 1 of Panel A of Table 3, 
I find that higher levels of acquiring firm cross ownership lowered the percentage of cash used as 
payment in a transaction by 1.5% for a 10% increase in acquirer cross ownership but that higher 
levels of target firm cross ownership increased the percentage of cash used by .5% for a 10% 
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increase in target cross ownership. Column 2 shows that the effects of lowering cash payment 
were strengthened for higher levels of target cross ownership and the opposite to be true from the 
perspective of acquiring cross ownership. These results were generally consistent with and 
without fixed effects. 
Panel B of Table 3 look at the first cross section of information asymmetry. Column 1 
illustrates that both acquiring and target firms with higher levels of R&D paid a lower percentage 
of cash consideration in deals by .6% and .02% for a 10% increase in acquirer and target cross 
ownership respectively. In looking at how the effects of cross ownership varied for firms with 
higher or lower R&D, Column 2 shows that the increased amount of R&D on the acquirer side 
and the target side increased the cash consideration used with the target increase significant at 
.5% for a 10% increase in R&D expense as a percentage of total revenue. Column 3 looks into 
how these effects vary for firms with higher and lower intangible assets. Specifically, higher 
levels of intangibles for both acquirer and target resulted in a lower percentage of cash 
consideration with the target decrease significant at .7% for a 10% increase in intangible assets 
as a percentage of total assets. These effects were mitigated for target firms with higher levels of 
cross ownership and increased for acquiring firms with higher levels of cross ownership. Column 
5 shows that higher 1-month bid ask spreads for acquiring firms resulted in higher percentages of 
cash used in deals by 8.6% for a 10% increase in the spread but for target firms resulted in lower 
percentages of cash used in deals by 1.9% for a 10% increase in the spread. The interactions in 
Column 6 suggest that for acquiring and target firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry tend to pay less in cash as that bid ask spread increases.  
 Panel C of Table 3 looks into the cross section of analyst following. Column 1 indicates 
that each additional analyst following for the acquiring and target firm reduces the cash 
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percentage used by .11% and .16% respectively. Column 2 indicates that these effects were 
mitigated for acquiring firms with higher levels of cross ownership and increased for target firms 
with higher levels of cross ownership by .22% and .14% respectively. Overall, analyst following 
generally contributes to a decrease in the cash percentage used in deal considerations. 
 The last 2 columns of Panel C of Table 3 look into the final cross section of cross 
ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership. Column 5 indicates that higher levels 
of cross ownership as a percentage of total ownership resulted in lower percentages of cash 
consideration used for both acquiring and target firms by .17% and .44% respectively for an 
increase of the cross ownership to total institutional ownership ratio by 10%. This effect was 
magnified for acquiring firms with higher levels of cross ownership and mitigated for target 
firms with higher levels of cross ownership by an additional 3.5% for a 10% increase in the cross 
ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership percentage for acquiring firms. 
Overall, these results indicate that cross ownership generally reduces the cash consideration 
percentage used in total deal consideration. 
 
3d. Synergies 
  
Brooks et al. found that deal synergies, measured by acquirer and target market value-
weighted average announcement returns, tended to be higher in the presence of institutional 
cross-owners (2018). In our results, it was unclear how significant the increases in deal synergies 
as a result of cross ownership were. Based on Panel A of Table 4, none of the independent 
variables were significant, but it seems that cross ownership generally increases the synergies 
achieved in deals to a small extent. 
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Panel B of Table 4 looks at these effects from an information asymmetry perspective. 
Specifically, Columns 1 and 2 show that only target R&D expenditures are significant in 
affecting synergies, with a 10% increase in those expenditures as a percentage of revenue 
resulting in a 1.4% decrease in synergies achieved. In looking at the interactions in Column 2, 
those results were consistent as increases in target R&D expenditures as a percentage of total 
revenue decrease synergies achieved, but that increased levels of cross ownership mitigated that 
effect. Columns 3 and 4 show that it was unclear how intangible assets affected synergies, but 
that the coefficients indicate that acquirer intangible assets seemed to decrease synergies 
achieved and target intangible assets seemed to increase synergies achieved. With regards to 1-
month bid ask spreads, Column 5 shows that only target bid ask spreads had any significant 
impact on deal synergies, increasing synergies by 7.8% a 10% increase in the bid ask spread for 
the target firm. Column 6 indicates that while the interaction terms were not significant, that this 
effect was mitigated for firms with higher levels of cross ownership. 
Panel C of Table 4 investigates the cross sections of analyst following and cross 
ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership. In the analyst following cross section 
and cross ownership cross section, there were no significant takeaways on the effects of both 
analyst following or cross ownership as a percentage of total ownership on deal synergies. 
However, based on the coefficients, it seems that both acquirer analyst following and acquirer 
and target cross ownership as a percentage of total institutional ownership reduced deal synergies 
and that target analyst following increased deal synergies marginally. 
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3e. Completion Probability 
 
 Brooks et al. found generally that the presence of institutional cross-ownership between 
two firms increases the probability of a merger pair formation and that the existence of 
institutional investor cross-ownership reduces the completion probability of deals with negative 
acquirer CAR, but has no effect on the completion probability of deals with positive acquirer 
CAR (2018). Panel A of Table 5 suggests generally that higher levels of acquiring and target 
firm cross ownership resulted in lower completion probability of the deal by 34% and 55% 
respectively. Column 2 shows the interaction of the two cross ownership variables and indicates 
that the greater the presence of the corresponding cross ownership, the lower the completion 
probability as well. 
 With regards to information asymmetry, Panel B of Table 5 indicates that the level of 
R&D did not have any significant effect on the completion probability of deals. However, the 
coefficients of the variables in Columns 1 and 2 suggest that higher levels of R&D expenditures 
scaled by total assets tends to lead to higher completion probability. Column 3 shows that 
acquirer intangible assets do have a significant impact on completion probability of deals, 
lowering the probability by .06% for a 10% increase in intangibles as a percentage of total assets. 
Column 4 indicates that the significance of the acquiring firm interaction term that the effect of 
reducing completion probability is increased for firms with higher intangibles. Columns 5 shows 
that target bid ask spreads do not play a significant role in completion probabilities but generally 
reduce the chances at the deal closing. While the individual acquirer and target firm spreads did 
not predict any changes in completion probability, Column 6 indicates that firms with higher 
levels of bid ask spreads increased the completion probability. 
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Panel C of Table 5 looks at the analyst following cross section. Column 1 shows that 
more analysts following target firms resulted in a slight decrease in completion probabilities by 
1% for each additional analyst. In the presence of the interaction in Column 2, the result was 
consistent and the interactions signal that the effect of the decrease in completion probability was 
magnified for deals with higher target cross ownership. 
 Finally, the last two columns of Panel C of Table 5 look at cross ownership as a 
percentage of total institutional ownership as a cross section. These independent variables did not 
significantly predict any changes to completion probability, but the coefficients signal that 
acquirer cross ownership may reduce completion probability while target cross ownership may 
improve completion probability. In Column 4, the significant interaction term for acquirer cross 
ownership shows that for acquiring firms with cross ownership, the higher that cross ownership 
is as a percent of total institutional ownership, the lower the completion probability of the deal. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
While cross ownership led to generally higher transaction fees, the governance powers of 
institutional investors cross owning both target and acquiring firms can be seen in their ability to 
influence lower deal premiums, something that is more flexible compared to standard advisory 
fees for deals. With cash and stock often used as substitutes for one another in deals, my findings 
were aligned with Brooks et al. that deals with cross owners tend to use more stock and less cash 
for payment. Given the high unpredictability of market returns surrounding deals, it was hard to 
identify any significant takeaways with regards to synergies under these three cross sections. My 
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findings on completion probability build on Brooks et al findings in showing that higher levels of 
target cross ownership ultimately reduce completion probability of deals. 
There were some limitations in the study, namely with some of the variables calculated 
based on market indices that were calculated without a value weighted market index to 
benchmark stock price changes. More broadly, there were some limitations in calculating a post-
deal metric as the synergies variable was based on a cumulative abnormal return over a 3 day 
window, rather than assessing the value achieved over a longer time horizon. In addition, there 
are many other confounding variables that may have explained the variation in the outcome 
variables I used. At the end of the day, M&A deals are a complex process involving various 
measurable and immeasurable factors that may ultimately affect outcomes; however, institutional 
investor cross ownership may provide some detail as to how deal makers can better strategize 
these deals moving forward. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 
Variable definitions. This table provides variable definitions and the corresponding data sources. CRSP refers to the Center for 
Research in Security Prices, SDC refers to the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company, 13F refers to the Thomson Reuters 
13F Database, and IBES refers to the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
 
 
  
Variable Definition Source
Dependent variables of interest
FTOT Total Transaction fees paid by acquirer and target firms SDC
DealPrem Deal premium paid: (transaction value/market value of target) - 1 SDC/CRSP
PCT_Cash Percentage of cash payment involved in the total value of the transaction SDC
Synergies
(acquirer CAR3 * acquirer market value + target CAR3 * (1 - toehold) * market value) / (acquirer market 
value + (1 - toehold) * target market value)
SDC/CRSP
Completed Indicator variable: one for deals that are completed, zero for withdrawn deals SDC
Acquirer and target firm characteristics
A(T)XrdRevt
Research and Development (R&D) expense scaled by total revenue in last fiscal year ending before 
announcement
Compustat
A(T)IntanAt Intangible assets scaled by total assets in last fiscal year ending before deal announcement Compustat
A(T)Bidask1M Mean bid-ask spread scaled by price during the 31 days prior to deal announcement CRSP
A(T)Bidask3M Mean bid-ask spread scaled by price during the 92 days prior to deal announcement CRSP
A(T)AnalystFollow
Number of unique analysts who provided an EPS forecast for the acquirer in the 365 days prior to deal 
announcement
IBES
A(T)coIo Cross owned shares divided by total shares owned by institutional investors at quarter end 13F
A(T)LogSize The natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year before the announcement Compustat
A(T)Lev Book value of debt over total assets at the end of the fiscal year before the deal announcement Compustat
A(T)CHE Cash holdings, including cash and marketable securities Compustat
A(T)CFtoE
Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred stocks 
divided by firm market value at the end of the fiscal year before the deal announcement
Compustat
A(T)Ret205 Buy-and-hold stock return over the (-205, -6) window CRSP
A(T)Std205 The standard deviation of the daily return over the (-205, -6) window CRSP
GrossCollateral
The gross value of property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of the fiscal year before deal 
announcement
Compustat
NetCollateral
The net value of property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of the fiscal year before deal 
announcement
Compustat
TotalIO Institutional onwership at the quarter end 13F
A(T)ROA Operating cash flows over total assets Compustat
A(T)Sales_Growth Percentage change in sales from the previous year Compustat
Deal characteristics
HostileDeal Indicator variable: one for hostile deals, zero otherwise. SDC
CompDeal Indicator variable: one if more than one firm is bidding for the target, zero otherwise SDC
TenderDeal Indicator variable: one for tender offers, zero otherwise SDC
DiversDeal Indicator variable: one if target and acquirer have different two-digit SIC Codes, zero otherwise SDC
RelSize
The ratio of transaction value to acquirer market value at the end of the fiscal year before the deal 
announcement
SDC/Compustat
Institutional cross-ownesrhip variables
A(T)CrossOwnPct Ownesrhip by acquirer (target) instutions that own target (acquirer) shares 13F
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Table A2 
Sample breakdown by year  
 
 
  
Year # of Deals Percent Year # of Deals Percent
1977 1 0.01 1998 623 6.14
1978 14 0.14 1999 645 6.35
1979 10 0.10 2000 570 5.61
1980 16 0.16 2001 387 3.81
1981 93 0.92 2002 215 2.12
1982 93 0.92 2003 241 2.37
1983 134 1.32 2004 239 2.35
1984 196 1.93 2005 220 2.17
1985 234 2.30 2006 257 2.53
1986 241 2.37 2007 273 2.69
1987 282 2.78 2008 204 2.01
1988 329 3.24 2009 163 1.61
1989 294 2.90 2010 152 1.50
1990 196 1.93 2011 108 1.06
1991 238 2.34 2012 130 1.28
1992 204 2.01 2013 124 1.22
1993 294 2.90 2014 168 1.65
1994 409 4.03 2015 198 1.95
1995 479 4.72 2016 144 1.42
1996 499 4.91 2017 116 1.14
1997 592 5.83 2018 129 1.27
Total 10,154 100
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Table A3 
Sample breakdown by industry code 
  
# of Deals 2-digit SIC Code Industry Description
1,214 67 Holding & Other Investment Offices
963 73 Business Services
746 28 Chemical & Allied Products
719 60 Depository Institutions
698 36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
580 48 Communications
469 35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment
388 38 Instruments & Related Products
383 13 Oil & Gas Extraction
320 49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services
274 63 Insurance Carriers
207 37 Transportation Equipment
201 80 Health Services
183 62 Security & Commodity Brokers
180 20 Food & Kindred Products
166 10 Metal, Mining
142 61 Nondepository Institutions
128 27 Printing & Publishing
127 34 Fabricated Metal Products
117 33 Primary Metal Industries
114 50 Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods
109 87 Engineering & Management Services
1,726 Other Other industries with < 102 deals in sample
10,154
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Table A4 
Dependent and Independent variable breakdown 
  
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl
FTOT 9.008 16.345 1.000 3.058 9.451
DealPrem 1.380 1.515 0.997 1.306 1.618
PCT_CASH 81.883 28.989 63.470 100.000 100.000
Synergies 0.208 3.377 0.000 0.114 0.301
Completed 0.725 0.447 0.000 1.000 1.000
ACrossOwnPct 0.167 0.185 0.024 0.097 0.259
TCrossOwnPct 0.197 0.215 0.028 0.113 0.303
AXrdRevt 0.115 1.922 0.000 0.000 0.039
TXrdRevt 0.164 0.730 0.000 0.000 0.050
AIntanAt 0.106 0.167 0.000 0.021 0.144
TIntanAt 0.082 0.150 0.000 0.003 0.093
ABidask1M 0.011 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.013
ABidask3M 0.011 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.014
TBidask1M 0.023 0.035 0.001 0.012 0.030
TBidask3M 0.024 0.035 0.001 0.012 0.032
AAnalystFollow 14.540 13.500 3.000 11.000 23.000
TAnalystFollow 7.119 8.843 1.000 4.000 10.000
AcoIo 0.318 0.260 0.094 0.264 0.503
TcoIo 0.495 0.301 0.247 0.516 0.739
ALogSize 7.651 2.453 6.038 7.797 9.440
TLogSize 5.648 2.254 4.031 5.548 7.188
ALev 0.584 0.247 0.415 0.583 0.787
TLev 0.544 0.284 0.314 0.546 0.770
ache 1946.350 5743.640 26.661 148.546 893.805
tche 242.690 862.885 4.071 21.908 97.377
ACFtoE 0.053 0.093 -0.034 0.050 0.096
TCFtoE -0.336 0.777 -0.230 0.034 0.100
ARet205 0.127 0.348 -0.071 0.084 0.265
TRet205 0.106 0.437 -0.150 0.072 0.301
AStd205 0.026 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.031
TStd205 0.037 0.024 0.021 0.031 0.046
GrossCollateral 0.494 0.365 0.203 0.406 0.721
NetCollateral 0.234 0.231 0.035 0.160 0.363
TotalIO 0.836 0.566 0.395 0.785 1.212
AROA 0.042 0.064 0.008 0.034 0.074
TROA -0.083 0.316 -0.054 0.012 0.057
ASalesGrowth -0.023 0.150 -0.085 -0.085 -0.026
TSalesGrowth -0.150 0.398 -0.286 -0.111 -0.006
HostileDeal 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.000
CompDeal 0.065 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000
TenderDeal 0.142 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000
DiversDeal 0.525 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
RelSize 0.332 0.650 0.000 0.066 0.367
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Table 1 – Panel A 
Basic regression of total transaction fees against cross ownership. 
Intercept -16.3600 ••• -15.7661 ••• 8.3946 8.5578
-10.41 -10.47 1.23 1.31
ACrossOwnPct 10.3748 ••• -18.8552 ••• 7.4236 ••• -20.6072 •••
5.00 -6.85 3.58 -7.56
TCrossOwnPct 4.2170 •• -21.0731 ••• 3.2895 • -21.6797 •••
2.42 -8.97 1.91 -9.25
ACrossOwncPct*TCrossOwnPct 82.2396 ••• 80.4273 •••
15.33 14.99
ALogSize 0.6886 ••• 0.9779 ••• 0.4507 •• 0.7129 •••
3.80 5.60 2.39 3.93
TLogSize 2.2495 ••• 2.5704 ••• 2.1574 ••• 2.4688 •••
9.51 11.29 8.87 10.56
ALev 0.2237 -0.5785 0.4189 -0.4307
0.19 -0.52 0.35 -0.38
TLev 1.1372 0.4709 1.8385 • 1.1362
1.17 0.51 1.91 1.23
ache 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.29 -0.61 0.53 -0.11
tche 0.0084 ••• 0.0070 ••• 0.0081 ••• 0.0068 •••
16.98 14.55 16.51 14.30
ACFtoE -9.4027 ••• -11.0847 ••• -4.4356 -5.2777 •
-3.05 -3.75 -1.37 -1.70
TCFtoE -0.2241 0.1703 -0.3419 0.0061
-0.39 0.31 -0.60 0.01
ARet205 -0.4802 -0.3367 -0.4276 -0.4883
-0.77 -0.56 -0.69 -0.82
TRet205 1.8444 ••• 1.8622 ••• 2.0158 ••• 1.9719 •••
3.57 3.76 3.94 4.03
AStd205 23.6511 24.8747 40.3202 • 31.5153
1.18 1.30 1.82 1.49
TStd205 14.5369 9.9311 16.8586 5.2366
1.05 0.75 1.20 0.39
GrossCollateral 6.3297 ••• 7.2188 ••• 6.0779 ••• 6.8213 •••
4.23 5.03 3.85 4.51
NetCollateral -11.4405 ••• -12.7909 ••• -9.5228 ••• -10.3798 •••
-4.67 -5.45 -3.40 -3.86
TotalIO -1.1862 •• 0.5075 -1.0173 • 0.6912
-2.18 0.95 -1.83 1.27
AROA 8.7505 •• 11.0682 ••• 10.2378 ••• 11.4812 •••
2.34 3.09 2.75 3.22
TROA -2.2380 • -2.4819 •• -0.4752 -0.8513
-1.92 -2.22 -0.41 -0.77
ASalesGrowth -2.9729 •• -2.6032 • -2.7876 • -2.2584
-1.96 -1.79 -1.83 -1.55
TSalesGrowth -0.3447 -0.4446 -0.5181 -0.4481
-0.55 -0.75 -0.85 -0.76
TAnalystFollow 0.3635 ••• 0.3559 ••• 0.3992 ••• 0.3898 •••
10.29 10.52 10.87 11.08
HostileDeal 0.5693 1.2691 1.7705 2.4635 •
0.41 0.96 1.30 1.89
CompDeal 0.2929 0.4421 0.7113 0.8263
0.31 0.49 0.76 0.92
TenderDeal -0.9247 • -0.6358 -1.1617 •• -0.8888 •
-1.88 -1.35 -2.32 -1.85
DiversDeal -1.2116 ••• -1.1828 ••• -0.6896 -0.6385
-2.87 -2.93 -1.55 -1.50
RelSize 0.0025 ••• 0.0025 ••• 0.0025 ••• 0.0025 •••
6.52 6.73 6.56 6.81
n 2624 2624 2624 2624
R-squared 0.554 0.591 0.609 0.642
Year + Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Transactions fees
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Table 1 – Panel B 
Regression of total transaction fees against cross-ownership under information asymmetry cross section. 
Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A.  
"InfoAsym" →
Intercept 8.3576 8.5981 6.8016 7.1547 7.5630 6.9710
1.22 1.26 0.99 1.05 1.11 1.02
ACrossOwnPct 7.3771 ••• 7.9068 ••• 7.5108 ••• 5.5721 •• 7.6029 ••• 9.4019 •••
3.56 3.78 3.63 2.34 3.67 4.16
TCrossOwnPct 3.2939 • 3.0349 • 3.0826 • 1.2982 3.2130 • 4.7018 •••
1.91 1.75 1.79 0.67 1.87 2.59
AInfoAsym 0.0957 0.2768 4.0262 ••• 1.9173 -1.3491 16.4617
0.32 0.89 2.89 0.98 -0.08 0.84
TInfoAsym 0.3032 0.1532 2.5371 • -0.3484 29.9447 ••• 45.9205 •••
0.90 0.32 1.78 -0.17 3.22 4.47
ACrossOwnPct* AInfoAsym -6.5394 • 9.0102 -287.0075 •••
-1.94 1.51 -2.75
TCrossOwnPct* TInfoAsym 0.9718 9.1278 • -218.8342 •••
0.78 1.76 -3.81
ALogSize 0.4529 •• 0.4323 •• 0.4298 •• 0.4296 •• 0.5180 ••• 0.5772 •••
2.39 2.28 2.27 2.27 2.68 3.00
TLogSize 2.1546 ••• 2.1526 ••• 2.1201 ••• 2.1513 ••• 2.2174 ••• 2.2642 •••
8.85 8.84 8.60 8.72 9.11 9.34
ALev 0.4212 0.4240 0.4343 0.5053 0.3832 0.3270
0.36 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.32 0.28
TLev 1.9960 •• 1.9789 •• 1.7166 • 1.6539 • 1.7080 • 1.6873 •
2.04 2.03 1.78 1.72 1.77 1.76
ache 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.48 0.44 0.79 0.67 0.40 0.01
tche 0.0081 ••• 0.0081 ••• 0.0082 ••• 0.0082 ••• 0.0080 ••• 0.0078 •••
16.51 16.52 16.66 16.67 16.32 15.97
ACFtoE -4.3313 -4.5615 -5.0725 -5.4152 • -5.3739 • -6.0719 •
-1.34 -1.41 -1.57 -1.68 -1.65 -1.88
TCFtoE -0.3925 -0.4350 -0.3764 -0.3644 -0.4123 -0.3383
-0.68 -0.76 -0.66 -0.64 -0.72 -0.60
ARet205 -0.4198 -0.4509 -0.3496 -0.3500 -0.4159 -0.5907
-0.68 -0.73 -0.57 -0.57 -0.66 -0.94
TRet205 2.0078 ••• 2.0087 ••• 2.0792 ••• 2.0612 ••• 2.3182 ••• 2.1958 •••
3.92 3.92 4.08 4.04 4.47 4.25
AStd205 39.7048 • 38.5767 • 50.8678 •• 48.2329 •• 46.2329 •• 44.8162 ••
1.79 1.74 2.29 2.17 2.05 1.99
TStd205 16.2297 16.7925 18.5462 18.2566 -0.0490 -6.8757
1.15 1.19 1.32 1.30 0.00 -0.46
GrossCollateral 6.1115 ••• 6.1682 ••• 6.8000 ••• 6.8756 ••• 5.9257 ••• 6.0832 •••
3.87 3.90 4.28 4.33 3.76 3.87
NetCollateral -9.5478 ••• -9.7470 ••• -9.0120 ••• -9.0207 ••• -9.2480 ••• -9.2897 •••
-3.40 -3.47 -3.22 -3.22 -3.30 -3.33
TotalIO -1.0309 • -0.9837 • -1.0100 • -0.8937 -0.8883 -0.6916
-1.86 -1.77 -1.82 -1.61 -1.59 -1.24
AROA 10.2506 ••• 9.4885 •• 11.8139 ••• 12.0870 ••• 10.5937 ••• 10.2006 •••
2.74 2.52 3.15 3.22 2.85 2.76
TROA -0.1027 -0.0947 -0.5930 -0.6092 -0.5551 -0.7531
-0.08 -0.08 -0.51 -0.53 -0.48 -0.65
ASalesGrowth -2.7975 • -2.8159 • -2.5099 • -2.4095 -3.0146 •• -3.1857 ••
-1.84 -1.85 -1.65 -1.58 -1.98 -2.11
TSalesGrowth -0.5395 -0.5796 -0.4225 -0.4503 -0.6784 -0.7236
-0.87 -0.94 -0.69 -0.73 -1.11 -1.19
TAnalystFollow 0.3993 ••• 0.4011 ••• 0.4027 ••• 0.4127 ••• 0.4065 ••• 0.3880 •••
10.87 10.92 10.98 11.20 11.07 10.57
HostileDeal 1.7918 1.7884 1.7779 1.8114 1.7272 1.6645
1.31 1.31 1.31 1.33 1.27 1.23
CompDeal 0.7129 0.7051 0.7617 0.8083 0.8621 0.6712
0.76 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.72
TenderDeal -1.1612 •• -1.1977 •• -1.1638 •• -1.1477 •• -1.1643 •• -1.0713 ••
-2.32 -2.38 -2.33 -2.30 -2.33 -2.15
DiversDeal -0.6920 -0.7161 -0.8048 • -0.7899 • -0.6911 -0.6886
-1.55 -1.60 -1.80 -1.77 -1.55 -1.56
RelSize 0.0025 ••• 0.0025 ••• 0.0024 ••• 0.0024 ••• 0.0025 ••• 0.0026 •••
6.55 6.51 6.39 6.43 6.69 6.78
n 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624
R-squared 0.609 0.610 0.611 0.613 0.611 0.615
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Transactions fees
R&D expenditures Bid-ask spreadIntangible assets
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Table 1 – Panel C 
Regression of total transaction fees against cross-ownership under analyst following and cross-
ownership as a percentage of total ownership cross sections. Detailed variables descriptions include in 
Appendix A.  
"CrossSecVar" →
Intercept 7.7748 7.6948 22.8734 ••• 27.4800 •••
1.13 1.14 2.90 3.73
ACrossOwnPct 7.3237 ••• 3.4035 7.6833 ••• -41.9593 •••
3.53 1.28 3.45 -11.33
TCrossOwnPct 3.3462 • -8.9956 ••• 4.0340 •• -20.6355 •••
1.94 -4.21 2.15 -4.61
ACrossSecVar -0.0239 -0.0676 •• 0.9862 -6.9847 •••
-0.90 -1.97 0.67 -4.75
TCrossSecVar 0.4104 ••• 0.0094 -1.4319 -1.9345 •
10.58 0.17 -1.40 -1.87
ACrossOwnPct* ACrossSecVar 0.1931 • 86.9164 •••
1.81 16.34
TCrossOwnPct* TCrossSecVar 1.0318 ••• 24.2591 •••
8.49 4.69
ALogSize 0.5658 •• 0.7944 ••• 0.4676 •• 0.5209 •••
2.49 3.50 2.40 2.86
TLogSize 2.1152 ••• 2.5233 ••• 2.2461 ••• 2.5577 •••
8.54 10.24 9.01 10.96
ALev 0.2291 -0.1215 0.0986 -0.0207
0.19 -0.10 0.08 -0.02
TLev 1.8106 • 0.9818 2.0313 •• 0.8756
1.88 1.03 2.11 0.97
ache 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
0.46 -0.40 0.79 1.26
tche 0.0081 ••• 0.0072 ••• 0.0072 ••• 0.0048 •••
16.52 14.77 14.72 10.29
ACFtoE -4.8699 -6.3143 •• -4.4622 -3.5606
-1.49 -1.97 -1.39 -1.19
TCFtoE -0.3335 -0.0976 -0.2528 0.4404
-0.58 -0.17 -0.44 0.82
ARet205 -0.4225 -0.1915 -0.3551 -0.1962
-0.68 -0.32 -0.58 -0.34
TRet205 2.0309 ••• 1.9376 ••• 1.9969 ••• 1.6497 •••
3.97 3.86 3.92 3.47
AStd205 41.4219 • 45.0341 •• 48.0649 •• 42.9372 ••
1.87 2.07 2.15 2.05
TStd205 17.2533 12.0467 17.1170 3.2992
1.23 0.87 1.20 0.25
GrossCollateral 6.1498 ••• 5.8872 ••• 6.3949 ••• 5.5251 •••
3.89 3.80 4.05 3.75
NetCollateral -9.5225 ••• -9.2214 ••• -9.8500 ••• -9.1144 •••
-3.39 -3.35 -3.50 -3.47
TotalIO -0.9653 • -0.1228 -0.7594 1.8500 •••
-1.73 -0.22 -1.27 3.16
AROA 10.7797 ••• 12.2597 ••• 11.7547 ••• 10.8513 •••
2.86 3.31 3.17 3.13
TROA -0.5029 -0.7041 -0.6506 -1.0246
-0.43 -0.62 -0.56 -0.94
ASalesGrowth -2.8376 • -2.8533 • -2.5123 • -2.2987
-1.87 -1.91 -1.66 -1.63
TSalesGrowth -0.5219 -0.6043 -0.4491 -0.4606
-0.85 -1.01 -0.73 -0.80
TAnalystFollow 0.3794 0.3100
10.22 8.90
HostileDeal 1.7356 1.4361 1.9239 1.9671
1.27 1.07 1.43 1.57
CompDeal 0.7105 0.9402 -0.1707 -0.1796
0.76 1.03 -0.18 -0.21
TenderDeal -1.1866 •• -1.1656 •• -1.1209 •• -0.6929
-2.37 -2.37 -2.26 -1.49
DiversDeal -0.7005 -0.8839 •• -0.6842 -0.5037
-1.57 -2.02 -1.54 -1.22
RelSize 0.0025 ••• 0.0027 ••• 0.0023 ••• 0.0022 •••
6.53 7.10 5.87 5.95
n 2624 2624 2560 2560
R-squared 0.609 0.625 0.613 0.664
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Transactions fees
Analyst Following CO / IO
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Table 2 – Panel A 
Basic regression of deal premium against cross ownership. 
  
Intercept -0.2335 -0.2330 -0.1372 -0.1374
-1.45 -1.45 -0.16 -0.16
ACrossOwnPct -0.8281 ••• -0.9863 ••• -1.0954 ••• -1.1009 •••
-3.65 -3.22 -4.69 -3.52
TCrossOwnPct 0.7030 ••• 0.5645 •• 0.6222 ••• 0.6172 ••
3.70 2.16 3.23 2.30
ACrossOwncPct*TCrossOwnPct 0.4722 0.0168
0.77 0.03
ALogSize 0.0681 ••• 0.0696 ••• 0.0537 ••• 0.0538 •••
3.83 3.89 2.80 2.79
TLogSize 0.0052 0.0071 -0.0147 -0.0146
0.23 0.31 -0.60 -0.60
ALev -0.0733 -0.0749 -0.0738 -0.0739
-0.60 -0.61 -0.58 -0.58
TLev 0.7477 ••• 0.7448 ••• 0.8166 ••• 0.8165 •••
7.24 7.20 7.71 7.70
ache 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 ••
-2.42 -2.47 -2.10 -2.10
tche -0.0001 • -0.0001 • -0.0001 • -0.0001 •
-1.68 -1.79 -1.77 -1.75
ACFtoE -0.6169 •• -0.6364 •• -0.7706 •• -0.7710 ••
-2.03 -2.09 -2.35 -2.35
TCFtoE -0.0594 -0.0575 -0.0440 -0.0440
-1.09 -1.05 -0.79 -0.79
ARet205 0.0094 0.0106 0.0329 0.0329
0.15 0.16 0.49 0.49
TRet205 -0.3604 ••• -0.3606 ••• -0.3718 ••• -0.3718 •••
-6.84 -6.84 -6.92 -6.92
AStd205 -0.9139 -0.9041 -0.5733 -0.5746
-0.45 -0.45 -0.25 -0.25
TStd205 14.1860 ••• 14.1616 ••• 13.2449 ••• 13.2430 •••
10.71 10.69 9.56 9.54
GrossCollateral 0.0031 0.0083 -0.0164 -0.0162
0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.09
NetCollateral 0.1959 0.1882 0.3014 0.3012
0.71 0.68 0.96 0.96
TotalIO 0.1834 ••• 0.1918 ••• 0.1265 •• 0.1268 ••
3.15 3.24 2.06 2.03
AROA 0.3590 0.3731 0.7047 • 0.7050 •
0.92 0.96 1.75 1.75
TROA 0.2494 •• 0.2467 •• 0.3509 ••• 0.3508 •••
2.30 2.28 3.15 3.15
ASalesGrowth -0.4257 ••• -0.4269 ••• -0.4131 ••• -0.4131 •••
-2.96 -2.97 -2.81 -2.81
TSalesGrowth 0.1230 •• 0.1227 •• 0.0976 0.0976
2.03 2.02 1.58 1.58
TAnalystFollow -0.0122 ••• -0.0122 ••• -0.0052 -0.0052
-3.17 -3.17 -1.26 -1.26
HostileDeal -0.2849 • -0.2814 • -0.2068 -0.2067
-1.75 -1.73 -1.26 -1.26
CompDeal 0.2998 ••• 0.2998 ••• 0.3199 ••• 0.3198 •••
2.72 2.72 2.86 2.86
TenderDeal 0.3397 ••• 0.3409 ••• 0.3316 ••• 0.3317 •••
5.88 5.90 5.58 5.58
DiversDeal -0.1539 ••• -0.1538 ••• -0.1560 ••• -0.1559 •••
-3.36 -3.36 -3.15 -3.15
RelSize 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 •••
11.81 11.78 10.94 10.93
n 4518 4518 4518 4518
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.144 0.144
Year + Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Deal Premium
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Table 2 – Panel B 
Regression of deal premium against cross-ownership under information asymmetry cross section. 
Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A. 
  
"InfoAsym" →
Intercept -0.1498 -0.1589 -0.1668 -0.1508 -0.1753 -0.1475
-0.17 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17
ACrossOwnPct -1.0866 ••• -1.1009 ••• -1.0994 ••• -1.1096 ••• -1.0673 ••• -1.0210 •••
-4.65 -4.67 -4.71 -4.19 -4.57 -3.99
TCrossOwnPct 0.6190 ••• 0.6033 ••• 0.6101 ••• 0.4613 •• 0.6202 ••• 0.4949 ••
3.22 3.11 3.17 2.15 3.22 2.40
AInfoAsym -0.0001 -0.0022 0.0327 0.0427 -3.4605 • -3.1257
-0.01 -0.14 0.21 0.20 -1.90 -1.56
TInfoAsym -0.0429 -0.0655 0.3069 • 0.0518 2.7014 ••• 1.9643 •
-1.27 -1.48 1.86 0.22 2.93 1.95
ACrossOwnPct* AInfoAsym 0.1972 -0.0577 -1.0471
0.46 -0.08 -0.10
TCrossOwnPct* TInfoAsym 0.1056 0.9588 11.3818 •
0.72 1.54 1.87
ALogSize 0.0552 ••• 0.0561 ••• 0.0557 ••• 0.0558 ••• 0.0522 ••• 0.0514 •••
2.87 2.92 2.89 2.90 2.66 2.61
TLogSize -0.0149 -0.0145 -0.0215 -0.0193 -0.0089 -0.0111
-0.61 -0.60 -0.87 -0.78 -0.36 -0.45
ALev -0.0748 -0.0759 -0.0772 -0.0817 -0.0666 -0.0618
-0.58 -0.59 -0.60 -0.64 -0.52 -0.48
TLev 0.7934 ••• 0.7911 ••• 0.8133 ••• 0.8149 ••• 0.8064 ••• 0.8044 •••
7.38 7.36 7.68 7.69 7.62 7.60
ache 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •
-2.09 -2.13 -2.03 -2.06 -2.01 -1.91
tche -0.0001 • -0.0001 • -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 • -0.0001 •
-1.76 -1.75 -1.56 -1.57 -1.84 -1.75
ACFtoE -0.7833 •• -0.7741 •• -0.7963 •• -0.8213 •• -0.7937 •• -0.7885 ••
-2.39 -2.36 -2.43 -2.50 -2.40 -2.39
TCFtoE -0.0386 -0.0381 -0.0429 -0.0418 -0.0437 -0.0464
-0.69 -0.68 -0.77 -0.75 -0.79 -0.84
ARet205 0.0321 0.0323 0.0346 0.0366 0.0178 0.0213
0.48 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.26 0.32
TRet205 -0.3707 ••• -0.3723 ••• -0.3701 ••• -0.3710 ••• -0.3499 ••• -0.3444 •••
-6.90 -6.92 -6.89 -6.90 -6.44 -6.33
AStd205 -0.5290 -0.5110 -0.2058 -0.2475 0.8300 0.8248
-0.23 -0.22 -0.09 -0.11 0.35 0.35
TStd205 13.1951 ••• 13.1464 ••• 13.2423 ••• 13.2401 ••• 11.4498 ••• 11.6570 •••
9.52 9.47 9.55 9.55 7.55 7.66
GrossCollateral -0.0282 -0.0206 0.0052 0.0080 -0.0050 -0.0141
-0.16 -0.11 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.08
NetCollateral 0.3174 0.3111 0.3194 0.3197 0.2778 0.2882
1.01 0.99 1.02 1.02 0.89 0.92
TotalIO 0.1259 •• 0.1242 •• 0.1318 •• 0.1364 •• 0.1263 •• 0.1193 •
2.05 2.02 2.14 2.21 2.04 1.92
AROA 0.7299 • 0.7334 • 0.7174 • 0.7393 • 0.7367 • 0.7418 •
1.81 1.81 1.77 1.82 1.83 1.84
TROA 0.2934 •• 0.2852 •• 0.3457 ••• 0.3510 ••• 0.3231 ••• 0.3336 •••
2.44 2.37 3.11 3.15 2.89 2.99
ASalesGrowth -0.4122 ••• -0.4120 ••• -0.4119 ••• -0.4134 ••• -0.4138 ••• -0.4048 •••
-2.81 -2.80 -2.80 -2.81 -2.81 -2.75
TSalesGrowth 0.1008 0.0977 0.1060 • 0.1036 • 0.0820 0.0796
1.63 1.57 1.71 1.67 1.32 1.29
TAnalystFollow -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0040
-1.29 -1.30 -1.22 -1.17 -1.17 -0.97
HostileDeal -0.2083 -0.2062 -0.2001 -0.1929 -0.2129 -0.2079
-1.27 -1.25 -1.22 -1.17 -1.30 -1.27
CompDeal 0.3177 ••• 0.3203 ••• 0.3243 ••• 0.3254 ••• 0.3322 ••• 0.3361 •••
2.84 2.86 2.90 2.91 2.97 3.01
TenderDeal 0.3313 ••• 0.3283 ••• 0.3313 ••• 0.3324 ••• 0.3340 ••• 0.3311 •••
5.58 5.51 5.58 5.60 5.63 5.58
DiversDeal -0.1572 ••• -0.1556 ••• -0.1640 ••• -0.1636 ••• -0.1557 ••• -0.1538 •••
-3.18 -3.14 -3.30 -3.30 -3.15 -3.11
RelSize 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 •••
10.95 10.97 10.91 10.89 11.05 11.05
n 4518 4518 4518 4518 4518 4518
R-squared 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.146 0.146 0.147
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Deal Premium
R&D expenditures Intangible assets Bid-ask spread
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Table 2 – Panel C 
Regression of deal premium against cross-ownership under analyst following and cross-ownership as a 
percentage of total ownership cross sections. Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A. 
  
"CrossSecVar" →
Intercept -0.0546 -0.0509 0.3346 0.3091
-0.06 -0.06 0.36 0.33
ACrossOwnPct -1.0871 ••• -1.1685 ••• -0.5547 •• -0.0613
-4.66 -3.80 -2.22 -0.14
TCrossOwnPct 0.6112 ••• 0.6384 ••• 0.8736 ••• 0.6231
3.17 2.64 4.31 1.19
ACrossSecVar 0.0037 0.0028 -0.8379 ••• -0.7606 •••
1.32 0.79 -5.37 -4.59
TCrossSecVar -0.0067 -0.0060 -0.0392 -0.0746
-1.57 -0.97 -0.38 -0.67
ACrossOwnPct* ACrossSecVar 0.0049 -0.8711
0.41 -1.39
TCrossOwnPct* TCrossSecVar -0.0034 0.3718
-0.26 0.61
ALogSize 0.0350 0.0365 0.0246 0.0234
1.47 1.50 1.23 1.17
TLogSize -0.0082 -0.0090 0.0373 0.0357
-0.33 -0.35 1.48 1.42
ALev -0.0446 -0.0458 -0.0171 -0.0147
-0.34 -0.35 -0.13 -0.11
TLev 0.8198 ••• 0.8194 ••• 0.7442 ••• 0.7501 •••
7.74 7.71 7.06 7.11
ache 0.0000 •• 0.0000 •• 0.0000 0.0000 •
-1.98 -1.96 -1.62 -1.70
tche -0.0001 • -0.0001 • -0.0001 •• -0.0001 •
-1.76 -1.73 -2.02 -1.72
ACFtoE -0.7047 •• -0.6998 •• -0.7824 •• -0.7715 ••
-2.13 -2.10 -2.41 -2.37
TCFtoE -0.0429 -0.0442 -0.0144 -0.0169
-0.77 -0.79 -0.26 -0.30
ARet205 0.0297 0.0299 0.0436 0.0429
0.45 0.45 0.66 0.65
TRet205 -0.3734 ••• -0.3738 ••• -0.3646 ••• -0.3621 •••
-6.95 -6.95 -6.81 -6.76
AStd205 -0.8448 -0.8663 -0.3066 -0.2953
-0.36 -0.37 -0.13 -0.13
TStd205 13.1982 ••• 13.2116 ••• 14.3050 ••• 14.3917 •••
9.52 9.53 10.22 10.27
GrossCollateral -0.0243 -0.0231 0.0674 0.0696
-0.13 -0.13 0.38 0.39
NetCollateral 0.2883 0.2907 0.2331 0.2336
0.92 0.93 0.74 0.75
TotalIO 0.1193 • 0.1210 • 0.0712 0.0652
1.93 1.92 1.09 0.96
AROA 0.5957 0.5943 0.8477 •• 0.8402 ••
1.45 1.45 2.13 2.11
TROA 0.3567 ••• 0.3566 ••• 0.3355 ••• 0.3418 •••
3.20 3.20 2.99 3.04
ASalesGrowth -0.4071 ••• -0.4086 ••• -0.3757 •• -0.3768 ••
-2.77 -2.78 -2.54 -2.55
TSalesGrowth 0.0975 0.0979 0.0844 0.0882
1.58 1.59 1.36 1.42
TAnalystFollow -0.0037 -0.0032
-0.90 -0.78
HostileDeal -0.2034 -0.2028 -0.1679 -0.1699
-1.24 -1.23 -1.03 -1.05
CompDeal 0.3192 ••• 0.3189 ••• 0.3168 ••• 0.3199 •••
2.86 2.85 2.88 2.90
TenderDeal 0.3344 ••• 0.3334 ••• 0.3132 ••• 0.3119 •••
5.63 5.61 5.37 5.34
DiversDeal -0.1523 ••• -0.1525 ••• -0.1368 ••• -0.1376 •••
-3.07 -3.08 -2.79 -2.81
RelSize 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 ••• 0.0005 •••
10.94 10.93 11.13 11.19
n 4518 4518 4342 4342
R-squared 0.145 0.145 0.158 0.159
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Deal Premium
Analyst Following CO / IO
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Table 3 – Panel A 
Basic regression of cash consideration percentage against cross ownership. 
  
Intercept 105.9365 ••• 105.9533 ••• 102.8772 ••• 102.9040 •••
30.37 30.37 8.04 8.05
ACrossOwnPct -15.8936 ••• -11.8293 •• -10.5187 •• -7.4838
-3.76 -2.10 -2.43 -1.31
TCrossOwnPct 5.4363 9.2443 • 3.3432 6.2372
1.55 1.87 0.95 1.25
ACrossOwncPct*TCrossOwnPct -13.0401 -9.9116
-1.09 -0.81
ALogSize 0.8505 •• 0.8173 •• 1.7334 ••• 1.7081 •••
2.30 2.21 4.35 4.27
TLogSize -2.3560 ••• -2.4193 ••• -1.2597 ••• -1.3131 •••
-5.01 -5.11 -2.59 -2.67
ALev 1.2262 1.2138 -0.9655 -0.9685
0.48 0.47 -0.35 -0.36
TLev -8.4009 ••• -8.2978 ••• -10.6032 ••• -10.5087 •••
-4.00 -3.94 -4.94 -4.89
ache 0.0003 ••• 0.0004 ••• 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 •••
3.13 3.18 2.84 2.89
tche -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0002
-0.48 -0.31 0.09 0.21
ACFtoE 20.9298 ••• 21.3860 ••• 16.2647 •• 16.6085 ••
3.29 3.35 2.43 2.48
TCFtoE -2.4787 •• -2.5427 •• -2.5713 •• -2.6193 ••
-2.08 -2.13 -2.15 -2.18
ARet205 -5.1838 ••• -5.1416 ••• -4.1194 ••• -4.0684 •••
-3.45 -3.42 -2.69 -2.65
TRet205 0.3148 0.3036 0.6248 0.6093
0.28 0.27 0.55 0.54
AStd205 -233.0748 ••• -232.8591 ••• -158.7422 ••• -157.0767 •••
-5.01 -5.00 -3.01 -2.98
TStd205 -78.6329 ••• -78.1626 ••• -17.1552 -16.4750
-2.75 -2.73 -0.58 -0.56
GrossCollateral 2.8327 2.7194 4.6713 4.6054
0.82 0.79 1.27 1.25
NetCollateral -17.5880 ••• -17.5031 ••• -18.1836 ••• -18.1599 •••
-3.06 -3.05 -2.74 -2.74
TotalIO -2.9609 •• -3.1394 ••• -1.2285 -1.3663
-2.47 -2.60 -0.98 -1.08
AROA 14.9384 • 14.7418 • 14.4886 • 14.3335 •
1.82 1.79 1.71 1.69
TROA 4.5276 • 4.6741 • 1.7935 1.9363
1.79 1.85 0.70 0.75
ASalesGrowth 4.0898 4.0075 5.7309 • 5.6913 •
1.30 1.28 1.80 1.79
TSalesGrowth 0.7913 0.8207 0.1040 0.1213
0.56 0.58 0.07 0.09
TAnalystFollow 0.0390 0.0416 -0.1928 •• -0.1902 ••
0.53 0.56 -2.44 -2.41
HostileDeal 9.4137 ••• 9.2677 ••• 8.0885 ••• 7.9725 •••
3.20 3.15 2.71 2.67
CompDeal -0.6844 -0.6835 -1.4134 -1.3983
-0.36 -0.36 -0.74 -0.73
TenderDeal 10.0245 ••• 9.9645 ••• 10.5037 ••• 10.4560 •••
10.08 10.01 10.21 10.15
DiversDeal 2.7498 ••• 2.7159 ••• 1.9279 • 1.9021 •
2.94 2.90 1.89 1.86
RelSize -0.0090 ••• -0.0089 ••• -0.0090 ••• -0.0089 •••
-10.00 -9.91 -9.89 -9.85
n 2773 2773 2773 2773
R-squared 0.214 0.215 0.278 0.278
Year + Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Cash Consideration
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Table 3 – Panel B 
Regression of cash consideration percentage against cross-ownership under information asymmetry 
cross section. Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A. 
  
"InfoAsym" →
Intercept 104.7022 ••• 104.2314 ••• 103.9263 ••• 104.2515 ••• 101.8217 ••• 101.2911 •••
8.19 8.16 8.11 8.13 7.95 7.90
ACrossOwnPct -10.2845 •• -11.4213 ••• -10.4624 •• -11.9939 •• -10.9513 •• -10.5170 ••
-2.38 -2.62 -2.42 -2.38 -2.53 -2.19
TCrossOwnPct 3.3081 2.3882 3.8122 1.0689 3.2681 4.0975
0.94 0.67 1.08 0.27 0.93 1.08
AInfoAsym -6.2133 ••• -8.8773 ••• -2.6577 -4.3070 86.1421 •• 92.1471 ••
-3.33 -3.40 -0.80 -0.96 2.25 2.18
TInfoAsym -0.2265 -1.5669 -7.8373 •• -12.2978 ••• -19.6731 -12.1947
-0.30 -1.53 -2.45 -2.69 -0.99 -0.56
ACrossOwnPct* AInfoAsym 19.4689 7.2783 -102.9434
1.64 0.51 -0.46
TCrossOwnPct* TInfoAsym 4.9307 • 15.2478 -112.2534
1.80 1.30 -0.93
ALogSize 1.6893 ••• 1.8015 ••• 1.7044 ••• 1.6953 ••• 1.8963 ••• 1.9183 •••
4.24 4.49 4.26 4.24 4.65 4.68
TLogSize -1.2523 ••• -1.2526 ••• -1.1223 •• -1.0488 •• -1.2624 ••• -1.2071 ••
-2.58 -2.58 -2.27 -2.11 -2.58 -2.45
ALev -1.1551 -1.4572 -0.9484 -0.8746 -1.0682 -1.1204
-0.42 -0.54 -0.35 -0.32 -0.39 -0.41
TLev -11.1189 ••• -11.1793 ••• -10.2983 ••• -10.3193 ••• -10.6604 ••• -10.7073 •••
-5.12 -5.16 -4.80 -4.80 -4.97 -4.99
ache 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 ••
2.92 2.73 2.60 2.58 2.58 2.51
tche 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0000
0.08 0.09 -0.23 -0.22 0.09 0.03
ACFtoE 15.4073 •• 15.6965 •• 17.3125 ••• 17.0050 •• 14.9396 •• 14.7499 ••
2.31 2.35 2.58 2.54 2.22 2.19
TCFtoE -2.6593 •• -2.6576 •• -2.6442 •• -2.6170 •• -2.6453 •• -2.6145 ••
-2.22 -2.22 -2.21 -2.18 -2.21 -2.18
ARet205 -4.2782 ••• -4.1564 ••• -4.1684 ••• -4.2419 ••• -3.6498 •• -3.6819 ••
-2.79 -2.72 -2.72 -2.77 -2.36 -2.38
TRet205 0.6490 0.4901 0.5273 0.5046 0.5598 0.5278
0.57 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.46
AStd205 -150.8874 ••• -145.1984 ••• -171.8487 ••• -172.8976 ••• -182.9742 ••• -183.0821 •••
-2.86 -2.75 -3.24 -3.26 -3.41 -3.41
TStd205 -16.8901 -22.1706 -16.2752 -15.0235 -4.4145 -6.4463
-0.57 -0.75 -0.55 -0.51 -0.14 -0.20
GrossCollateral 4.5856 4.7494 3.7594 3.7807 4.5047 4.6426
1.24 1.29 1.01 1.02 1.22 1.26
NetCollateral -18.4776 ••• -18.3331 ••• -18.9853 ••• -18.9738 ••• -17.8222 ••• -17.9829 •••
-2.79 -2.77 -2.86 -2.86 -2.69 -2.71
TotalIO -1.1383 -1.2504 -1.4012 -1.3431 -1.0161 -0.9632
-0.91 -1.00 -1.12 -1.07 -0.81 -0.76
AROA 12.0605 12.7021 13.7836 14.3934 • 15.4176 • 15.2207 •
1.42 1.49 1.62 1.69 1.82 1.79
TROA 0.5956 0.2904 2.3147 2.3624 1.7553 1.5729
0.22 0.11 0.90 0.91 0.68 0.61
ASalesGrowth 6.1281 • 6.4941 •• 5.6398 • 5.7389 • 5.4828 • 5.3810 •
1.93 2.04 1.77 1.80 1.72 1.69
TSalesGrowth 0.1291 0.0138 -0.1229 -0.1694 0.2513 0.1916
0.09 0.01 -0.09 -0.12 0.18 0.13
TAnalystFollow -0.1846 -0.1910 -0.1829 -0.1819 -0.1981 -0.2094
-2.34 -2.42 -2.32 -2.30 -2.51 -2.63
HostileDeal 8.1053 ••• 8.1739 ••• 7.9193 ••• 8.0989 ••• 8.2219 ••• 8.2183 •••
2.73 2.75 2.66 2.72 2.76 2.76
CompDeal -1.6051 -1.4581 -1.5470 -1.4849 -1.5020 -1.5492
-0.84 -0.77 -0.81 -0.78 -0.79 -0.81
TenderDeal 10.4892 ••• 10.3480 ••• 10.4969 ••• 10.5348 ••• 10.4649 ••• 10.5401 •••
10.22 10.06 10.22 10.25 10.17 10.22
DiversDeal 1.8142 • 1.8946 • 2.2458 •• 2.2887 •• 1.9004 • 1.8682 •
1.78 1.86 2.18 2.23 1.86 1.83
RelSize -9.0553 ••• -8.9611 ••• -8.9235 ••• -8.9302 ••• -9.0115 ••• -9.0118 •••
-10.01 -9.91 -9.86 -9.87 -9.96 -9.95
n 2773 2773 2773 2773 2773 2773
R-squared 0.281 0.283 0.280 0.281 0.279 0.280
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Cash Consideration
R&D expenditures Intangible assets Bid-ask spread
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Table 3 – Panel C 
Regression of cash consideration percentage against cross-ownership under analyst following and cross-
ownership as a percentage of total ownership cross sections. Detailed variables descriptions include in 
Appendix A.  
  
"CrossSecVar" →
Intercept 100.5240 ••• 100.7006 ••• 101.6271 ••• 100.2834 •••
7.83 7.84 7.29 7.20
ACrossOwnPct -11.2036 ••• -14.0846 ••• -9.1615 • 11.3568
-2.59 -2.58 -1.84 1.25
TCrossOwnPct 3.8617 4.6492 5.9863 6.3898
1.09 1.04 1.49 0.61
ACrossSecVar -0.1052 •• -0.1427 •• -1.6945 1.7764
-2.04 -2.11 -0.51 0.50
TCrossSecVar -0.1603 •• -0.1261 -4.4139 •• -5.1158 ••
-1.99 -1.05 -2.00 -2.14
ACrossOwnPct* ACrossSecVar 0.2200 -35.5539 •••
0.88 -2.71
TCrossOwnPct* TCrossSecVar -0.1444 1.2530
-0.56 0.10
ALogSize 2.1962 ••• 2.2486 ••• 2.0051 ••• 1.9895 •••
4.79 4.83 4.77 4.74
TLogSize -1.4270 ••• -1.4671 ••• -1.1920 •• -1.3335 ••
-2.89 -2.91 -2.31 -2.57
ALev -2.0178 -2.0547 -0.3674 -0.2469
-0.73 -0.74 -0.13 -0.09
TLev -10.6466 ••• -10.6163 ••• -10.6030 ••• -10.2185 •••
-4.96 -4.94 -4.77 -4.59
ache 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 ••• 0.0003 •• 0.0003 ••
2.68 2.67 2.42 2.32
tche 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0009
0.11 0.12 0.18 0.69
ACFtoE 14.7775 •• 14.8785 •• 12.6540 • 12.8968 •
2.20 2.20 1.85 1.89
TCFtoE -2.5678 •• -2.6154 •• -2.4576 •• -2.6147 ••
-2.15 -2.18 -1.96 -2.09
ARet205 -4.0127 ••• -4.0128 ••• -3.6968 •• -3.5200 ••
-2.62 -2.62 -2.37 -2.25
TRet205 0.7147 0.7062 0.1776 0.2606
0.63 0.62 0.15 0.22
AStd205 -149.3362 ••• -150.1339 ••• -189.0376 ••• -182.7052 •••
-2.82 -2.84 -3.47 -3.35
TStd205 -16.1672 -15.2373 -8.2972 -2.8475
-0.55 -0.51 -0.27 -0.09
GrossCollateral 4.7633 4.7275 4.1634 4.1778
1.29 1.28 1.10 1.10
NetCollateral -17.7620 ••• -17.5208 ••• -17.2445 •• -17.1182 ••
-2.68 -2.64 -2.52 -2.50
TotalIO -0.6424 -0.6349 -1.6750 -2.3065
-0.50 -0.49 -1.24 -1.64
AROA 17.3951 •• 17.2927 •• 17.8410 •• 18.3228 ••
2.03 2.02 2.04 2.10
TROA 1.4711 1.4641 0.7871 1.2293
0.57 0.57 0.30 0.46
ASalesGrowth 5.3264 • 5.2572 • 5.4753 • 5.4196 •
1.67 1.65 1.68 1.66
TSalesGrowth 0.0320 0.0586 0.0474 0.2272
0.02 0.04 0.03 0.15
TAnalystFollow -0.1825 -0.1626
-2.21 -1.96
HostileDeal 8.1119 ••• 8.1519 ••• 7.4684 •• 7.3407 ••
2.72 2.74 2.46 2.42
CompDeal -1.4253 -1.4425 -1.0223 -0.8938
-0.75 -0.76 -0.53 -0.46
TenderDeal 10.3758 ••• 10.3531 ••• 10.6571 ••• 10.5466 •••
10.08 10.04 10.18 10.06
DiversDeal 1.8506 • 1.8568 • 1.7229 • 1.6404
1.81 1.82 1.65 1.57
RelSize -8.9399 ••• -8.9245 ••• -8.8613 ••• -8.7728 •••
-9.88 -9.85 -9.49 -9.40
n 2773 2773 2647 2647
R-squared 0.279 0.279 0.287 0.289
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Cash Consideration
Analyst Following CO / IO
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Table 4 – Panel A 
Basic regression of synergies against cross ownership. 
  
Intercept 0.1046 0.1052 0.4774 0.5004
0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31
ACrossOwnPct 0.4203 0.6753 0.3563 0.6954
0.88 1.05 0.72 1.05
TCrossOwnPct 0.1393 0.3704 0.1698 0.4813
0.34 0.66 0.41 0.83
ACrossOwncPct*TCrossOwnPct -0.8141 -1.0965
-0.60 -0.78
ALogSize -0.0370 -0.0395 -0.0645 -0.0679
-0.93 -0.98 -1.47 -1.54
TLogSize 0.0105 0.0071 -0.0318 -0.0370
0.21 0.14 -0.59 -0.68
ALev 0.2921 0.2942 0.2347 0.2394
1.03 1.04 0.78 0.79
TLev 0.3506 0.3539 0.3434 0.3498
1.48 1.50 1.39 1.42
ache 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-1.18 -1.14 -1.19 -1.14
tche -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.44 -0.35 -0.26 -0.15
ACFtoE 0.0733 0.1052 0.5564 0.5872
0.10 0.15 0.73 0.77
TCFtoE -0.1198 -0.1233 -0.0975 -0.1015
-0.97 -1.00 -0.77 -0.80
ARet205 -0.0764 -0.0785 -0.1160 -0.1169
-0.50 -0.51 -0.73 -0.74
TRet205 -0.1915 -0.1904 -0.1895 -0.1883
-1.55 -1.54 -1.50 -1.49
AStd205 -9.4505 •• -9.4927 •• -9.1008 • -9.0445 •
-2.02 -2.03 -1.67 -1.66
TStd205 6.8077 •• 6.8540 •• 7.5796 •• 7.7016 ••
2.24 2.26 2.36 2.39
GrossCollateral 0.0369 0.0301 0.0864 0.0785
0.10 0.08 0.21 0.19
NetCollateral -0.2162 -0.2058 -0.6821 -0.6714
-0.36 -0.34 -0.97 -0.95
TotalIO -0.0926 -0.1030 -0.0694 -0.0837
-0.72 -0.79 -0.51 -0.61
AROA 1.2237 1.2001 1.4527 1.4325
1.35 1.32 1.54 1.52
TROA -0.2302 -0.2267 -0.2428 -0.2360
-0.89 -0.88 -0.90 -0.88
ASalesGrowth -0.3177 -0.3150 -0.2986 -0.2965
-0.94 -0.93 -0.86 -0.85
TSalesGrowth -0.0103 -0.0084 0.0107 0.0120
-0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.08
TAnalystFollow 0.0033 0.0034 0.0093 0.0096
0.39 0.40 1.03 1.06
HostileDeal 0.0682 0.0607 0.1272 0.1182
0.17 0.16 0.32 0.30
CompDeal -0.0630 -0.0621 -0.0117 -0.0089
-0.24 -0.24 -0.04 -0.03
TenderDeal -0.0095 -0.0125 -0.0124 -0.0174
-0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13
DiversDeal -0.0519 -0.0519 -0.0774 -0.0779
-0.49 -0.49 -0.66 -0.67
RelSize 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.09 -0.06 -0.47 -0.45
n 5388 5388 5388 5388
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.020 0.020
Year + Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Synergies
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Table 4 – Panel B 
Regression of synergies against cross-ownership under information asymmetry cross section. Detailed 
variables descriptions include in Appendix A. 
  
"InfoAsym" →
Intercept 0.4658 0.4603 0.5132 0.5043 0.2636 0.2565
0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.16
ACrossOwnPct 0.3663 0.3438 0.3572 0.4150 0.3930 0.1546
0.74 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.79 0.28
TCrossOwnPct 0.1613 0.0841 0.1697 0.3808 0.1365 0.2484
0.39 0.20 0.41 0.82 0.33 0.55
AInfoAsym 0.0054 0.0056 -0.1397 -0.0964 -2.0874 -3.8000
0.20 0.19 -0.37 -0.19 -0.50 -0.85
TInfoAsym -0.1360 • -0.2378 •• 0.0257 0.3906 7.8127 ••• 8.2635 •••
-1.65 -2.21 0.07 0.73 3.61 3.53
ACrossOwnPct* AInfoAsym 0.2637 -0.2241 20.7726
0.24 -0.14 0.95
TCrossOwnPct* TInfoAsym 0.5210 -1.3898 -5.6221
1.43 -0.96 -0.40
ALogSize -0.0602 -0.0583 -0.0632 -0.0636 -0.0531 -0.0549
-1.37 -1.33 -1.44 -1.45 -1.18 -1.22
TLogSize -0.0327 -0.0310 -0.0334 -0.0374 -0.0108 -0.0116
-0.61 -0.58 -0.62 -0.69 -0.20 -0.21
ALev 0.2277 0.2221 0.2324 0.2368 0.2197 0.2186
0.75 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.72
TLev 0.2772 0.2704 0.3462 0.3456 0.3174 0.3154
1.11 1.08 1.40 1.40 1.29 1.28
ache 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-1.17 -1.23 -1.22 -1.21 -1.20 -1.16
tche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
-0.26 -0.24 -0.26 -0.24 -0.43 -0.38
ACFtoE 0.5132 0.5267 0.5684 0.5995 0.3831 0.3910
0.67 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.50 0.51
TCFtoE -0.0847 -0.0843 -0.0960 -0.0980 -0.1042 -0.1039
-0.67 -0.67 -0.76 -0.77 -0.82 -0.82
ARet205 -0.1179 -0.1167 -0.1178 -0.1183 -0.1178 -0.1169
-0.75 -0.74 -0.74 -0.75 -0.74 -0.73
TRet205 -0.1907 -0.1976 -0.1894 -0.1864 -0.1214 -0.1229
-1.51 -1.56 -1.49 -1.47 -0.95 -0.96
AStd205 -8.9649 • -8.8778 -9.2559 • -9.2270 • -6.8921 -6.6373
-1.65 -1.63 -1.69 -1.68 -1.24 -1.19
TStd205 7.4302 •• 7.2532 •• 7.5230 •• 7.5025 •• 2.6419 2.6467
2.31 2.26 2.34 2.33 0.76 0.76
GrossCollateral 0.0575 0.0791 0.0738 0.0690 0.0833 0.0921
0.14 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.23
NetCollateral -0.6451 -0.6636 -0.6987 -0.7008 -0.6983 -0.7068
-0.91 -0.94 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -1.00
TotalIO -0.0670 -0.0702 -0.0692 -0.0745 -0.0348 -0.0248
-0.49 -0.51 -0.51 -0.55 -0.25 -0.18
AROA 1.5232 1.4889 1.4061 1.3714 1.5588 • 1.5679 •
1.61 1.57 1.48 1.44 1.65 1.66
TROA -0.4004 -0.4299 -0.2388 -0.2442 -0.3122 -0.3129
-1.40 -1.50 -0.89 -0.91 -1.16 -1.16
ASalesGrowth -0.2978 -0.2959 -0.3083 -0.3076 -0.3377 -0.3290
-0.86 -0.85 -0.89 -0.88 -0.97 -0.94
TSalesGrowth 0.0230 0.0109 0.0124 0.0164 -0.0387 -0.0384
0.16 0.08 0.09 0.11 -0.27 -0.27
TAnalystFollow 0.0092 0.0090 0.0094 0.0092 0.0113 0.0115
1.01 0.99 1.03 1.01 1.24 1.25
HostileDeal 0.1235 0.1327 0.1295 0.1159 0.1254 0.1229
0.31 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.31
CompDeal -0.0186 -0.0094 -0.0110 -0.0086 0.0220 0.0236
-0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.09
TenderDeal -0.0133 -0.0272 -0.0118 -0.0133 -0.0135 -0.0155
-0.10 -0.20 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
DiversDeal -0.0821 -0.0799 -0.0769 -0.0791 -0.0731 -0.0725
-0.70 -0.68 -0.65 -0.67 -0.62 -0.62
RelSize -0.0456 -0.0434 -0.0473 -0.0470 -0.0447 -0.0445
-0.44 -0.42 -0.46 -0.45 -0.43 -0.43
n 5388 5388 5388 5388 5388 5388
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.023
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Synergies
R&D expenditures Intangible assets Bid-ask spread
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Table 4 – Panel C 
Regression of synergies against cross-ownership under analyst following and cross-ownership as a 
percentage of total ownership cross sections. Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A. 
  
"CrossSecVar" →
Intercept 0.3993 0.3892 0.6526 0.6405
0.24 0.24 0.35 0.34
ACrossOwnPct 0.3287 -0.2953 0.7131 1.1236
0.66 -0.46 1.27 1.12
TCrossOwnPct 0.1996 0.3635 0.4039 0.0940
0.48 0.69 0.87 0.08
ACrossSecVar -0.0040 -0.0112 -0.3950 -0.3279
-0.66 -1.46 -1.09 -0.85
TCrossSecVar 0.0108 0.0158 -0.1470 -0.1854
1.15 1.17 -0.61 -0.71
ACrossOwnPct* ACrossSecVar 0.0426 -0.7248
1.57 -0.49
TCrossOwnPct* TCrossSecVar -0.0263 0.4298
-0.86 0.30
ALogSize -0.0466 -0.0351 -0.0664 -0.0672
-0.91 -0.67 -1.40 -1.42
TLogSize -0.0394 -0.0442 -0.0397 -0.0409
-0.72 -0.79 -0.69 -0.71
ALev 0.2008 0.1835 0.1843 0.1877
0.66 0.60 0.58 0.59
TLev 0.3433 0.3456 0.3809 0.3852
1.39 1.40 1.48 1.49
ache 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-1.25 -1.24 -1.25 -1.28
tche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.26 -0.21 -0.13 -0.06
ACFtoE 0.4865 0.5024 0.3803 0.3844
0.63 0.65 0.48 0.48
TCFtoE -0.0996 -0.1098 -0.1122 -0.1137
-0.79 -0.87 -0.85 -0.86
ARet205 -0.1143 -0.1128 -0.0872 -0.0881
-0.72 -0.71 -0.53 -0.53
TRet205 -0.1878 -0.1894 -0.1935 -0.1912
-1.48 -1.49 -1.47 -1.45
AStd205 -8.8682 -9.0138 • -9.2191 -9.2226
-1.62 -1.65 -1.61 -1.61
TStd205 7.6465 •• 7.7402 •• 7.8163 •• 7.8734 ••
2.38 2.41 2.31 2.32
GrossCollateral 0.0928 0.1030 0.1823 0.1829
0.23 0.25 0.43 0.43
NetCollateral -0.6696 -0.6555 -0.8208 -0.8188
-0.95 -0.93 -1.11 -1.10
TotalIO -0.0519 -0.0429 -0.1803 -0.1809
-0.37 -0.31 -1.23 -1.20
AROA 1.5542 1.5525 1.6803 • 1.6721 •
1.63 1.62 1.71 1.70
TROA -0.2454 -0.2411 -0.2634 -0.2580
-0.91 -0.90 -0.93 -0.92
ASalesGrowth -0.3048 -0.3196 -0.3110 -0.3116
-0.88 -0.92 -0.85 -0.86
TSalesGrowth 0.0118 0.0187 0.0091 0.0123
0.08 0.13 0.06 0.08
TAnalystFollow 0.0119 0.0124
1.25 1.28
HostileDeal 0.1255 0.1343 0.1219 0.1199
0.31 0.34 0.30 0.29
CompDeal -0.0105 -0.0090 0.0058 0.0094
-0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.03
TenderDeal -0.0168 -0.0208 -0.0400 -0.0403
-0.12 -0.15 -0.28 -0.28
DiversDeal -0.0809 -0.0826 -0.0785 -0.0780
-0.69 -0.70 -0.65 -0.64
RelSize -0.0470 -0.0389 -0.0357 -0.0327
-0.46 -0.38 -0.33 -0.30
n 5388 5388 5143 5143
R-squared 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Synergies
Analyst Following CO / IO
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Table 5 – Panel A 
Basic regression of completion variable against cross ownership. 
  
Intercept 0.7052 ••• 0.7188 •••
14.83 15.39
ACrossOwnPct -0.3411 •• 0.1475
2.17 0.22
TCrossOwnPct -0.5531 ••• -0.1254
7.56 0.21
ACrossOwncPct*TCrossOwnPct -1.4775 •••
5.16
ALogSize 0.1554 ••• 0.1498 •••
60.70 55.68
TLogSize -0.1377 ••• -0.1444 •••
31.09 33.75
ALev -0.4996 ••• -0.4971 •••
12.63 12.50
TLev 0.0490 0.0598
0.17 0.25
ache 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 •••
6.32 5.60
tche -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 •••
25.80 22.28
ACFtoE -0.9025 ••• -0.8544 •••
7.42 6.62
TCFtoE 0.0151 0.0119
0.06 0.04
ARet205 0.1943 ••• 0.1916 •••
6.29 6.12
TRet205 -0.0013 -0.0023
0.00 0.00
AStd205 1.8210 1.6932
0.64 0.55
TStd205 -1.2600 -1.2361
0.71 0.69
GrossCollateral 0.2481 • 0.2337
1.78 1.58
NetCollateral -0.2455 -0.2310
0.67 0.59
TotalIO 0.4627 ••• 0.4425 •••
45.84 41.18
AROA 0.5206 0.4774
1.31 1.10
TROA 0.3563 ••• 0.3611 •••
7.72 7.92
ASalesGrowth -0.0605 -0.0536
0.14 0.11
TSalesGrowth 0.0764 0.0784
1.26 1.33
TAnalystFollow -0.0137 ••• -0.0135 •••
13.10 12.59
HostileDeal -2.3384 ••• -2.3471 •••
221.22 222.58
CompDeal -1.4359 ••• -1.4377 •••
184.95 184.97
TenderDeal 1.8252 ••• 1.8209 •••
258.39 257.04
DiversDeal -0.0617 -0.0609
1.28 1.25
RelSize 0.0910 ••• 0.0946 •••
4.21 4.54
n 7992 7992
R-squared 0.128 0.129
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = Completion Probability
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Table 5 – Panel B 
Regression of completed variable against cross-ownership under information asymmetry cross section. 
Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A. 
  
"InfoAsym" →
Intercept 0.7340 ••• 0.7370 ••• 0.8068 ••• 0.8068 ••• 0.7088 ••• 0.7934 •••
15.84 15.95 18.91 18.91 14.55 17.96
ACrossOwnPct -0.3394 •• -0.3219 • -0.2829 -0.0929 -0.3405 •• -0.6197 •••
2.15 1.92 1.48 0.12 2.16 5.72
TCrossOwnPct -0.5533 ••• -0.5216 ••• -0.5375 ••• -0.4649 ••• -0.5526 ••• -0.6269 •••
7.56 6.60 7.11 4.16 7.54 8.15
AInfoAsym -0.0100 -0.0062 -0.5957 ••• -0.3910 ••• -0.1647 -2.9530 ••
0.79 0.26 11.61 2.80 0.01 2.31
TInfoAsym -0.0367 0.0027 -0.1567 -0.0526 -0.0355 -0.8145
0.96 0.00 0.71 0.04 0.00 0.57
ACrossOwnPct* AInfoAsym -0.1986 -0.9942 • 46.2186 •••
0.53 1.79 10.94
TCrossOwnPct* TInfoAsym -0.2175 -0.3365 16.3309 •••
1.62 0.24 4.43
ALogSize 0.1558 ••• 0.1552 ••• 0.1667 ••• 0.1652 ••• 0.1549 ••• 0.1476 •••
60.62 60.04 67.65 66.22 58.12 52.19
TLogSize -0.1381 ••• -0.1389 ••• -0.1366 ••• -0.1405 ••• -0.1378 ••• -0.1424 •••
31.22 31.55 29.69 31.15 30.85 32.71
ALev -0.5063 ••• -0.5106 ••• -0.5196 ••• -0.5220 ••• -0.4982 ••• -0.4941 •••
12.94 13.14 13.62 13.71 12.47 12.24
TLev 0.0250 0.0285 0.0528 0.0600 0.0493 0.0353
0.04 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.09
ache 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 •••
6.19 5.77 8.95 9.12 6.26 4.21
tche -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 •••
25.70 25.99 25.25 24.23 25.75 21.56
ACFtoE -0.9227 ••• -0.9258 ••• -0.9164 ••• -0.8863 ••• -0.9022 ••• -0.8884 •••
7.75 7.80 7.62 7.11 7.42 7.17
TCFtoE 0.0190 0.0196 0.0214 0.0204 0.0153 0.0122
0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.04
ARet205 0.1907 ••• 0.1883 ••• 0.1901 ••• 0.1889 ••• 0.1932 ••• 0.1909 •••
6.05 5.89 6.00 5.93 6.09 5.93
TRet205 0.0017 0.0054 -0.0038 -0.0007 -0.0018 0.0045
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AStd205 1.7199 1.7178 1.3499 1.2224 1.8588 1.8488
0.57 0.57 0.35 0.29 0.62 0.61
TStd205 -1.2541 -1.2339 -1.4057 -1.4781 -1.2227 -1.1817
0.71 0.68 0.89 0.98 0.55 0.51
GrossCollateral 0.2445 • 0.2352 0.2144 0.2043 0.2487 • 0.2594 •
1.72 1.59 1.32 1.20 1.78 1.94
NetCollateral -0.2464 -0.2401 -0.3987 • -0.3889 • -0.2456 -0.2709
0.67 0.64 1.74 1.65 0.67 0.81
TotalIO 0.4623 ••• 0.4660 ••• 0.4707 ••• 0.4625 ••• 0.4618 ••• 0.4666 •••
45.77 46.38 47.31 45.38 45.24 45.30
AROA 0.5191 0.5211 0.3008 0.2935 0.5193 0.5338
1.29 1.30 0.43 0.41 1.30 1.37
TROA 0.3029 ••• 0.3103 ••• 0.3524 ••• 0.3578 ••• 0.3571 ••• 0.3505 •••
4.84 5.07 7.51 7.73 7.70 7.37
ASalesGrowth -0.0538 -0.0406 -0.0944 -0.0917 -0.0595 -0.0136
0.11 0.06 0.33 0.31 0.13 0.01
TSalesGrowth 0.0810 0.0846 0.0802 0.0798 0.0766 0.0786
1.42 1.54 1.38 1.37 1.26 1.32
TAnalystFollow -0.0137 -0.0137 -0.0145 -0.0148 -0.0137 -0.0122
13.14 13.05 14.53 15.01 13.09 10.15
HostileDeal -2.3406 ••• -2.3434 ••• -2.3549 ••• -2.3565 ••• -2.3384 ••• -2.3497 •••
221.42 221.81 223.28 223.72 221.17 223.34
CompDeal -1.4368 ••• -1.4391 ••• -1.4362 ••• -1.4378 ••• -1.4361 ••• -1.4387 •••
185.03 185.49 184.52 184.83 184.71 184.59
TenderDeal 1.8267 ••• 1.8308 ••• 1.8235 ••• 1.8230 ••• 1.8251 ••• 1.8184 •••
258.61 259.62 258.32 258.13 258.32 255.62
DiversDeal -0.0642 -0.0674 -0.0774 •• -0.0771 •• -0.0616 -0.0587
1.39 1.53 2.01 1.99 1.28 1.16
RelSize 0.0921 ••• 0.0914 ••• 0.0995 ••• 0.0998 ••• 0.0909 ••• 0.0902 •••
4.31 4.25 5.00 5.03 4.20 4.12
n 7992 7992 7992 7992 7992 7992
R-squared 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.130 0.128 0.131
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Deal Premium
R&D expenditures Intangible assets Bid-ask spread
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Table 5 – Panel C 
Regression of completed variable against cross-ownership under analyst following and cross-ownership 
as a percentage of total ownership cross sections. Detailed variables descriptions include in Appendix A.  
  
"CrossSecVar" →
Intercept 0.6999 ••• 0.6959 ••• 0.9324 ••• 0.9073 •••
14.52 14.34 21.64 20.30
ACrossOwnPct -0.3530 •• -0.1134 -0.1930 1.0067 •••
2.28 0.15 0.56 3.99
TCrossOwnPct -0.5436 ••• -0.4383 ••• -0.4511 ••• -0.9823 •••
7.19 2.85 4.09 3.16
ACrossSecVar -0.0011 0.0020 -0.1004 0.0782
0.14 0.29 0.40 0.21
TCrossSecVar -0.0132 ••• -0.0106 ••• 0.0401 -0.0391
10.57 3.36 0.12 0.09
ACrossOwnPct* ACrossSecVar -0.0159 -1.9520 •••
1.56 7.89
TCrossOwnPct* TCrossSecVar -0.0041 0.7609
0.09 1.39
ALogSize 0.1592 ••• 0.1530 ••• 0.1325 ••• 0.1302 •••
50.30 45.04 36.52 35.22
TLogSize -0.1403 ••• -0.1440 ••• -0.1576 ••• -0.1619 •••
29.85 30.11 34.61 36.08
ALev -0.5075 ••• -0.4981 ••• -0.3793 ••• -0.3660 •••
12.74 12.26 6.40 5.95
TLev 0.0503 0.0568 0.0364 0.0521
0.18 0.22 0.08 0.17
ache 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 ••• 0.0000 •••
6.43 5.81 3.03 3.75
tche -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 ••• -0.0002 •••
25.61 24.31 23.59 18.61
ACFtoE -0.9166 ••• -0.8868 ••• -0.9266 ••• -0.9187 •••
7.56 7.02 7.13 7.00
TCFtoE 0.0144 0.0133 0.0118 0.0096
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02
ARet205 0.1950 ••• 0.1921 ••• 0.1739 ••• 0.1734 •••
6.33 6.14 4.48 4.47
TRet205 -0.0011 0.0020 -0.0028 0.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AStd205 1.8597 1.9086 0.8014 0.7608
0.66 0.70 0.11 0.10
TStd205 -1.2532 -1.2019 -0.8340 -0.7274
0.71 0.65 0.26 0.20
GrossCollateral 0.2500 • 0.2473 • 0.2247 0.2196
1.80 1.77 1.35 1.29
NetCollateral -0.2422 -0.2400 -0.1971 -0.1759
0.65 0.64 0.40 0.31
TotalIO 0.4667 ••• 0.4542 ••• 0.4093 ••• 0.3931 •••
45.46 42.30 31.47 26.99
AROA 0.5496 0.5278 0.3262 0.3103
1.42 1.30 0.47 0.43
TROA 0.3563 ••• 0.3597 ••• 0.4197 ••• 0.4291 •••
7.72 7.85 9.43 9.85
ASalesGrowth -0.0629 -0.0559 -0.0890 -0.0850
0.15 0.12 0.27 0.24
TSalesGrowth 0.0763 0.0757 0.0468 0.0535
1.26 1.24 0.42 0.54
TAnalystFollow -0.0108 -0.0099
7.42 6.10
HostileDeal -2.3391 ••• -2.3384 ••• -2.3825 ••• -2.3824 •••
221.36 221.24 216.12 215.83
CompDeal -1.4357 ••• -1.4378 ••• -1.4685 ••• -1.4666 •••
184.87 185.18 183.55 182.38
TenderDeal 1.8252 ••• 1.8247 ••• 1.8820 ••• 1.8762 •••
258.29 258.23 253.20 251.64
DiversDeal -0.0626 -0.0592 -0.0573 -0.0558
1.32 1.18 1.03 0.97
RelSize 0.0910 ••• 0.0892 ••• 0.1166 ••• 0.1209 •••
4.21 4.05 6.06 6.49
n 7992 7992 7529 7529
R-squared 0.128 0.129 0.131 0.132
Year + Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable = Deal Premium
Analyst Following CO / IO
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